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The concept of semi-presidentialism was first operationalised by Maurice Duverger. 
There are now 17 countries with semi-presidential constitutions in Europe. Within this 
set of countries France is usually considered to be the archetypal example of semi-
presidentialism. This article maps the main institutional and political features of 
European semi-presidentialism on the basis of Duverger’s original three-fold schema. The 
most striking feature is the diversity of practice within this set of countries. This means 
that semi-presidentialism should not be operationalised as a discrete explanatory variable. 
However, there are ways of systematically capturing the variation within semi-
presidentialism to allow cross-national comparisons. This diversity also means that 
France should not be considered as the archetypal semi-presidential country. At best, 
France is an archetypal example of a particular type of semi-presidentialism. Overall, 
Duverger’s main contribution to the study of semi-presidentialism was the original 
identification of the concept and his implicit insight that there are different types of semi-
presidentialism. In the future, the study of semi-presidentialism would benefit from the 
development of theory-driven comparative work that avoids a reliance on France as the 
supposed semi-presidential archetype. 
 
Maurice Duverger first introduced the idea of semi-presidentialism as a regime 
type separate from presidentialism and parliamentarism in 1970 (Duverger, 
1970). He was the first person to complete a full-scale comparative work on semi-
presidentialism, Echec au roi, in 1978 (Duverger, 1978). He also published the first 
English-language article on the topic in 1980 (Duverger, 1980). Even though 
Duverger’s substantive addition to the literature on semi-presidentialism 
effectively ended with the publication of a book that he edited in 1986 (Duverger, 
ed., 1986),1 by this time the concept of semi-presidentialism was being widely 
debated and the comparative analysis of semi-presidential countries had already 
become a focus of international academic attention. The third wave of 
democratization in the early 1990s further increased the interest in semi-
presidentialism as the number of semi-presidential countries increased quickly 
and as the effects of regime types were systematically studied (for example, Linz, 
1994). The consolidation of many of these democracies, particularly in Central 
and Eastern Europe, has not diminished the interest in semi-presidentialism. 
Indeed, only recently one leading scholar wrote that semi-presidentialism 
“apparently is a regime type whose time has come” (Shugart, 2005, p. 344). 
 In France, the introduction of the direct election of the president, 
following the October 1962 constitutional amendment, established the Fifth 
Republic as a semi-presidential regime. This terminology is still not accepted 
within the French community of constitutional lawyers. However, within the 
international political science community France is almost unanimously 
acknowledged as having a semi-presidential system. More than that, France is 
often considered to be the archetypal example of such a system. For instance, 
while the list of semi-presidential countries can still vary from one writer to the 
next, France is always included in such a list. When the debate about the 
institutional effect of regime types was debated in the early 1990s, the French 
experience was often central to the discussion about the pros and cons of semi-
presidentialism. In other words, within the political science community France 
remains a standard reference point for the study of semi-presidentialism. 
 This paper examines France’s claim to be the archetypal example of semi-
presidentialism. Now that there are up to 60 semi-presidential countries in the 
world, 19 of which are in the greater European area including Russia, to what 
extent is France the typical example of semi-presidentialism, or even the typical 
example of European semi-presidentialism? In addressing this question, we 
reflect on Duverger’s contribution to the study of semi-presidentialism. Focusing 
only on the experience of semi-presidentialism in Europe, we argue that semi-
presidentialism is best understood as comprising an heterogeneous set of 
countries and that even in a European context France can at best be seen as an 
example of only one form of semi-presidentialism rather than as an example of 
semi-presidentialism as a whole. We suggest that Duverger’s enduring 
contribution to the study of semi-presidentialism lies in his very identification of 
the concept and in his implicit insight that there are different types of semi-
presidentialism. 
 
Duverger’s idea of semi-presidentialism and the number of semi-presidential 
countries 
 
The main contribution of Duverger to the study of semi-presidentialism lies in 
his formulation of semi-presidentialism as a separate regime type. Prior to his 
work, the parliamentary/presidential dichotomy was the long-established 
analytical focus of governmental systems. For example, in the early 1940s the 
well-known debate between Don Price (1943) and Harold Laski (1944) focused 
solely on the parliamentary/presidential dichotomy. Moreover, when Duverger 
first identified the concept of semi-presidentialism there were very few semi-
presidential regimes in existence apart from France, and those that did exist were 
in small countries usually overlooked by political scientists at that time – Austria, 
Finland, Iceland and Ireland. Therefore, it is remarkable that it took Duverger 
less than a decade after the French shift to semi-presidentialism to conceptualize 
the idea coherently and to start to analyze the politics of semi-presidential 
countries comparatively. 
While Duverger’s conceptualization of the idea was seminal, his definition 
of semi-presidentialism has proved to be problematic. By 1980, he had arrived at 
his standard definition: 
[A] political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the 
constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) the 
president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he 
possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, 
however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive 
and governmental power and can stay in office only if the 
parliament does not show its opposition to them (Duverger, 1980, p. 
166). 
Elsewhere, I have demonstrated at length that the problem with this 
definition is the issue of what should count as “quite considerable” presidential 
powers (Elgie, 1999; Elgie, 2007). Different people make different judgment calls. 
As a result, the list of semi-presidential regimes varies from one person to next. 
This introduces the problem of selection bias when the effects of semi-
presidentialism are studied. As a result, there is a tendency now to define semi-
presidentialism simply as the situation where there is both a popularly-elected 
fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet responsible to the 
legislature. (See, for example, Shugart, 2005; and 2006). This greatly reduces the 
level of disagreement about the list of semi-presidential countries. 
The reformulated version of Duverger’s definition means that we can 
identify semi-presidential countries simply by reading their constitution. In a 
European context, there are currently up to 19 semi-presidential countries, 
depending on where the boundaries of Europe are set.2 (See Figure 1).3 In the rest 
of this article, we compare France with 14 other European semi-presidential 
systems. We leave aside consideration of Belarus, because democracy collapsed 
almost immediately after the introduction of semi-presidentialism; Russia, 
because only part of the country is in the European geographical area; and both 
Montenegro and Serbia, because semi-presidential systems were only formalised 
there following the formal dissolution of the union of the two countries in 2007. 
In the next section, we use Duverger’s standard schema for analysing the politics 
of semi-presidentialism to engage in an institutional mapping exercise of the 15 
European countries under consideration. This mapping exercise will help to 
determine whether or not France can be considered the archetypal semi-
presidential country. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Explaining presidential influence: Duverger’s three variables 
 
Duverger’s main focus was the operation of semi-presidentialism in France. For 
example, in Echec au roi (Duverger, 1978) over half of the book is taken up with 
an analysis of the French situation. However, he applied his analysis of French 
politics comparatively. In particular, he was concerned with the 
presidentialisation of political systems in semi-presidential countries and with 
the variation in presidential influence over time. So, we can take Duverger’s 
dependent variable to be the systemic influence of the president. A problem, 
though, is that he does not provide a measure of such influence. Instead, he 
identifies a number of ‘modalities’, including a hegemonic presidency and a 
limited presidency. (See, for example, Duverger, 1996, pp. 518-587). 
Unfortunately, these modalities are poorly specified and a contemporary 
researcher would be expected to identify them much more rigorously.  
To explain the different modalities of presidential influence, Duverger 
identified three key variables: the president’s constitutional powers; the 
founding context of the regime; and the president’s relationship with the 
parliamentary majority. In the rest of this section, we identify these variables and 
compare the situation in France with the situation in the 14 other European 
countries under consideration to see whether France is part of a modal group or 
an outlier.  
 
The president’s constitutional powers 
 
Duverger was one of the first academics to try to measure the president’s 
constitutional powers. In Echec au roi, he identified 14 constitutional powers and 
then identified the situation for each of the six West European countries with 
which he was concerned (Duverger, 1978, pp. 22-23). He did not come up with a 
score as such, but he did offer a ranking of presidents using his indicators. (See 
Figure 2). On the basis of Duverger’s rankings, France is not an archetypal semi-
presidential country. The French president is constitutionally one of the weakest 
in Western Europe. 
 Figure 2 about here 
 Since Duverger, the measurement of presidential powers has become a 
cottage industry. Here, we report the scores for the 15 European semi-
presidential countries on the basis of two such measures. The first is the long-
standing measure identified by Shugart and Carey (1992). This way of measuring 
presidential power has been criticised (Metcalf, 2000), but it has been widely 
used in the academic literature and it has the advantage of being replicable.4 The 
second is a more recent measure by Siaroff (2003) and is based on a very different 
set of indicators. This measure is also contestable,5 but, again, it is replicable and 
it has started to be used in comparative analyses. (See Tables 1 and 2). 
 Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 The measures reinforce the idea that European semi-presidentialism is 
heterogenous. On the basis of the Shugart and Carey criteria, the president’s 
constitutional powers range from a score of 0 in Ireland to 13 in Ukraine prior to 
the 2006 reforms. In theory, the maximum score possible is 40. However, in their 
comparative work the maximum score that Shugart and Carey (1992, p. 155) 
recorded was 15 in Chile. Most presidential systems they measured had a score 
of around 11-12. So, the calculations here confirm that European semi-
presidential systems range from the situation where practice is purely 
parliamentary, as in Ireland, to at least one case where practice is consistent with 
politics in a pure presidential regime. The modal score is 2, suggesting that in 
Europe the dominant form of semi-presidentialism is parliamentary-like. 
However, only three of the 20 cases recorded this score. So, again, the inherent 
heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism is noticeable. The average score is 5.7, 
suggesting some sort of limited but not insignificant role for the president.  
 On the basis of the Siaroff criteria, the same heterogeneity is present. The 
measures range from the lowest possible score of 1 - Austria, Iceland and 
Slovenia6 - to a high of 7 of a possible 9 – France and Ukraine. The average score 
is 4.3, again suggesting a limited but not insignificant presidency, whereas the 
modal score is 6. Again, the spread of scores suggests that European semi-
presidentialism ranges from parliamentary-like systems to presidential-like 
systems, given that 7 is the modal score for the presidential regimes that Siaroff 
measures (Siaroff, 2003, pp. 296-297). 
According to the Shugart and Carey criteria, France scores 5. This  figure 
suggests that the French president’s constitutional powers are slightly less than 
the European semi-presidential average, but that they are not out of line. Thus, 
the 1958 constitution would appear to establish a moderately powerful 
presidency. By contrast, according to the Siaroff criteria, France scores 7, which is 
considerably higher than the average score and which is consistent with the 
modal score for presidential regimes. Given Duverger ranks France as having 
one of the weakest presidencies in Western Europe, taken together these 
rankings and scores probably tell us more about the perils of measuring 
presidential powers than the extent of the powers themselves. Nonetheless, we 
can conclude that only the Shugart and Carey criteria indicate that France has 
anything like an archetypal semi-presidential system in terms of the president’s 
constitutional powers. However, even this statement ignores the great variation 
across the set of semi-presidential countries. 
Overall, on the basis of constitutional powers alone, it may be more 
accurate to conclude that there is no such thing as an archetypal semi-
presidential regime and that at best France is only an archetypal example of a 
particular form of semi-presidentialism, whether presidential-like on the basis of 
the Siaroff criteria or a mixed premier-presidential form on the basis of the 
Shugart and Carey scores. 
 
The founding context 
 
In his 1980 article Duverger stressed that the founding context of semi-
presidentialism helps to explain the subsequent extent of presidential influence 
over the political system. He underlines the importance of the “combination of 
tradition and circumstances” (Duverger, 1980, p. 180) that affect the evolution of 
semi-presidential regimes and he states that these factors are important not 
merely at the moment of constitution building but also in the early years of the 
new regime. Duverger argues that the founding context is a major reason why 
the extent of the president’s constitutional powers is a poor predictor of the 
president’s actual influence over the system as a whole. 
 Figure 3 provides a snapshot of the founding context of European semi-
presidential systems. We can see that France is slightly unusual in terms of the 
context in which semi-presidentialism was adopted. Most countries chose semi-
presidentialism as part of an overall constitutional package. Most countries also 
chose semi-presidentialism at the point of democratization and/or statehood. 
However, with Poland, Romania and Ukraine, France is part of a small group of 
countries that adopted semi-presidentialism as a constitutional amendment 
rather than as a full constitutional package. Even so, Poland, Romania and 
Ukraine quickly went on to adopt full constitutions that incorporated the semi-
presidential amendment. So, France is unusual within this set of countries. In 
addition, with Ireland, France is part of an even smaller group that did not adopt 
semi-presidentialism at the point of democratization and/or statehood. So, the 
context in which semi-presidentialism was adopted in France is somewhat 
unique in a European context. France is the only country where semi-
presidentialism was adopted as a constitutional amendment when democracy 
was already established.7 Again, this suggests that France should not be viewed 
as an archetypal example of European semi-presidentialism. 
 Figure 3 about here. 
What difference does the founding context make? Figure 3 suggests that 
Duverger was surely right that the founding context can be crucial in 
determining the subsequent operation of a system. For example, in Croatia semi-
presidentialism was adopted in the context of the break up of the former 
Yugoslavia and the subsequent conflict situation. There was a new majority 
party that had a strong leader. The direct election of the president was a way of 
legitimizing the party’s rule and the leader’s position. Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
Croatia developed a strong presidency at least in the early years of the 
independence. By contrast, in Slovenia the threat of war was very quickly absent. 
The incumbent president was a popular figure and was considered likely to win 
a direct election. However, the president’s party did not have a majority and the 
other political forces were wary of giving the presidency too many powers in the 
near certainty that their candidates would lose the presidential election. In other 
words, in contrast to its geographical neighbour, very different geopolitical and 
party political circumstances in Slovenia encouraged the creation of a figurehead 
presidency. 
 The equivalent situation in France is well known. The 1958 constitution 
established a parliamentary system with an indirectly elected president. 
However, de Gaulle was an active president in the early years of the presidency, 
especially in foreign and defence policy, but not exclusively so. Major reforms, in 
education and the economy for example, would not have been presented without 
the support of the president and the intervention of the president’s advisers. He 
appointed prime ministers who were loyal supporters of his vision of reform. In 
April 1961 he invoked Article 16 and assumed emergency powers until 30 
September. On 7 October 1962, three weeks before the referendum that approved 
the constitutional amendment to directly elect the president, de Gaulle dissolved 
the National Assembly following the government’s defeat in a motion of 
confidence. Overall, the president was the key political actor even prior to the 
1962 reform. The 1962 reform merely confirmed existing political practice and 
was deliberately designed to institutionalize the presidency’s pre-eminence over 
the system in the future.  
 Duverger is surely right to suggest that the founding context can be 
crucial for determining the subsequent operation of a system, but the extent to 
which this concept is useful in the comparative study of semi-presidentialism can 
be questioned. Duverger presents the founding context as an explanatory 
variable. He argues that it can explain why some presidents with strong 
constitutional powers are very weak and vice versa, and he applies this argument 
to the French case very persuasively. However, the founding context is a catch-
all term that incorporates a set of other variables – party political, external events 
and so forth. Therefore, the founding context cannot serve as an explanatory 
variable in the simple way that Duverger suggests. More than that, Duverger 
does not specify the conditions under which the founding context makes a 
difference as opposed to those when it does not and, when it makes a difference, 
he fails to specify the conditions that lead to a strong presidency despite the 
constitutional situation, as opposed to those that lead to a weak presidency 
similarly. In short,  while the founding context seems to make a difference to the 
subsequent operation of semi-presidentialism, much more work needs to be 
done to unpack the notion of the founding context so as to allow us to predict 
both the circumstances under which the founding context has a major effect on 
subsequent events and, in that case, the circumstances under which it leads to 
either a strong or a weak presidency. 
 
The president’s relationship with the parliamentary majority 
 
While Duverger emphasises the constitutional powers of president and the 
founding context of semi-presidential regimes, his main explanatory variable for 
the different modalities of presidential influence is the president’s relationship 
with the parliamentary majority. In his political science textbook, Duverger 
outlines his argument very clearly and in the context of West European semi-
presidentialism generally: “In practice presidential power depends above all on 
the presence or absence of a parliamentary majority and the president’s 
relationship with the forces that comprise it” (Duverger, 1996, p. 511).8 As 
regards the latter variable, Duverger identifies three basic scenarios: the 
president as the leader of the majority; the president opposed to the majority; 
and the president as a disciplined member of the majority. The extent of the 
president’s influence over the system as a whole, he says, will vary as a function 
of whether or not there is a majority and, if there is, which of these three 
scenarios is present (ibid., p. 514-517). According to Duverger, when there is no 
majority, the president’s constitutional powers are weakened (ibid., p. 515). 
When the president leads a majority, the prime minister’s constitutional powers 
are weakened and the president has “almost absolute control” (ibid., p. 516) of 
the legislature. When the the president is opposed to the majority (under 
cohabitation), the prime minister acts as a British-style head of government but 
the president is still able to use any constitutional powers granted to the 
institution (ibid., p. 517). When the president is a disciplined member of the 
majority, then, contrary to the situation under cohabitation, the president cannot 
act against the will of the prime minister (ibid.) 
 Table 3 maps the frequency of these relationships in terms of three 
indicators: 1.) cohabitation, namely where the president and prime minister are 
from different parties and where no representatives of the president’s party are 
in government; 2.) the situation where the president and prime minister are from 
different parties but where the president’s party is part of a coalition 
government; and 3.) whether the government has majority or minority support 
in the lower house of parliament. 
On the basis of these indicators there is a clear distinction between West 
European and Central and East European semi-presidential countries. The latter 
have experienced more minority government on average, though this is hardly 
suprising given the chaotic party systems in that region in the early 1990s. In 
turn, West European semi-presidential countries have experienced more 
cohabitation and more periods when the president and prime minister have been 
from different coalition parties. Indeed, with the notable exception of Slovakia,  it 
is very rare for presidents and prime ministers to have been from different 
coalition parties in Central and East European semi-presidential countries. 
However, this situation is mainly due to the tendency towards non-party 
presidents in this region. Given such presidents have often had clear party 
backgrounds in the past, the figures for the incidence of presidents and prime 
ministers from different parties in Central and Eastern Europe is probably 
underestimated. In addition to certain regional differences, there are some trends 
across European semi-presidentialism as a whole. For example, three countries 
have never experienced cohabitation, while four countries have experienced it 
more than 33 per cent of the time. So, it would appear that some countries are 
more ‘cohabitation-prone’ than others. Equally, seven countries have 
experienced minority governments less than 10 per cent of the time, whereas the 
other eight countries have all experienced in more than 25 per cent of the time. 
Clearly this difference is a function of party politics, but it also points to ways in 
which different types of semi-presidential governments might be systematically 
identified. Overall, though, across the set of countries the outstanding feature of 
these indicators is the diversity of European semi-presidentialism. 
 Table 3 about here 
 For its part, France has experienced cohabitation almost exactly as often as 
the European average overall. However, it has experienced the situation where 
the president is from one party and the prime minister is from a coalition party 
much more infrequently than average. The same is true of minority government. 
In the French case, the presence or absence of a majority and the president’s 
relationship with the majority helps to explain the president’s influence over the 
system. The difference in the president’s weak position under cohabitation 
compared with the president’s dominant position when he has appointed a 
prime minister with the support of a loyal presidential majority in the legislature 
is very clear. In addition, the relative weakness of the presidency in the period 
1988-93 is also at least partly explained by the absence of an absolute majority of 
support in the legislature for President Mitterrand. Figure 4 updates Duhamel’s 
(1995) extrapolation of Duverger’s logic to identify the various relationships in 
more detail still. 
 Figure 4 about here 
In this context, the significance of the introduction of the quinquennat is 
apparent. The reduction of the president’s term of office to five years and the 
reordering of the electoral calendar such that National Assembly elections now 
take place in the period immediately following the presidential election means 
that cohabitation is less likely than before. The successful candidate at the 
presidential election will have won a majority of the vote at the second ballot and 
there is a strong likelihood that the new Assembly will reflect this majority. Also, 
given that the presidential and parliamentary terms are now the same length and 
synchronised, then all else equal there is no opportunity for ‘mid-term’ elections 
that return an Assembly majority opposed to the president. 
That said, the ambiguities of the 2000 reform remain. The death or 
premature resignation of the president may mean that the presidential and 
assembly terms go out of sync. Unless they are re-synchronised by a dissolution, 
the threat of mid-term cohabitation would  then re-emerge. The 2000 reform also 
raises more general questions about the the president’s power to dissolve the 
Assembly. If the president dissolves the Assembly, then unless the president 
resigns at the same time as the dissolution, which would be a high-risk strategy, 
or unless the president dissolves the Assembly again immediately after the next 
presidential election,9 the terms of the two institutions will be out of sync and the 
threat of mid-term cohabitation would re-emerge. Thus, there is a sense in which 
the quinquennat reform reduces the likelihood of Assembly dissolution. Finally, 
even though the synchronisation of the electoral calendars reduces the risk of 
cohabitation, it does not rule it out altogether, nor does it rule out the risk of the 
Assembly elections returning no overall majority for the president, again 
introducing one of Duverger’s scenarios where the president is likely to be less 
powerful than is usually the case. Indeed, in Romania, which is the only other 
European country with synchronised elections, cohabitation has been avoided, 
but minority government has been quite common. (See Table 3). 
 Overall, Duverger’s schema of presidential/parliamentary relations helps 
us to understand variations in (or modalities of) presidential influence in the 
French case. That said, it is unclear how useful it is comparatively. Firstly, 
concepts such as cohabitation have no resonance in parliamentary-like 
presidential countries. In Ireland, there were some tensions between the Labour 
President, Mary Robinson, and the Fianna Fáil government during one period of 
cohabitation in the early 1990s, but the circumstances were not comparable to the 
French case. The same point can be made about Austria, Iceland and Slovenia. In 
countries such as these, the power of the president scarcely varies. The president 
is simply weak whatever the relationship between the president and parliament. 
Instead, the prime minister’s influence varies as a function of the relationship 
between the prime minister and parliament. Secondly, it is unclear that minority 
government necessarily weakens the president as Duverger suggests. Cindy 
Skach (2005) argues the opposite. What she calls ‘divided minority government’, 
where “neither the president nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, 
enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature” (ibid., p. 17), can, she argues, 
“predictably lead to an unstable scenario, characterized by shifting legislative 
coalitions and government reshuffles, on the one hand, and continuous 
presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, on the other” (ibid., pp. 17-
18). In contrast to Duverger, Skach argues: “The greater the legislative 
immobilism, governmental instability, and cabinet reshuffling resulting from the 
minority position of the government, the more justified or pressured the 
president may feel to use their powers beyond their constitutional limit, for a 
prolonged period of time” (ibid., p. 18). This scenario may explain the power of 
the Ukrainian president, despite the long periods of minority government in the 
country. In short, Duverger’s variable provides a useful explanation of why 
presidential power varies within France, but it is not clear that it helps to explain 
the politics of semi-presidentialism generally. 
 
What does this institutional mapping exercise tell us about European semi-
presidentialism? What does it tell us about Duverger’s comparative analysis of 
semi-presidentialism given that the universe of semi-presidentialism has 
increased well beyond the six West European countries with which Duverger 
was acquainted?  
 The first point to be made is that Duverger’s schema for the study of semi-
presidentialism is problematic. He fails to specify his dependent variable clearly. 
His measure of the president’s constitutional powers is contestable. His 
conceptualisation of the founding context lacks rigour. His conclusions about the 
importance of the president’s relationship with the parliamentary majority may 
apply well to France, but there are limits to its comparative application. In short, 
Duverger’s deserves great credit for first introducing the concept of semi-
presidentialism, but, as it stands, his schema for studying semi-presidentialism is 
fundamentally flawed. 
The second point is that there is little point searching for an archetypal 
semi-presidential regime. Countries with semi-presidential constitutions operate 
in very different ways. The consequence of this observation is that semi-
presidentialism, as defined here, should not be used as a single explanatory 
variable. For example, it would be methodologically non-sensical to compare 
countries with parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential constitutions as 
regards, for example, their respective democratic performance. Even if 
parliamentary and presidential countries were sufficiently homogeneous to treat 
each as a single category, the same is not true for semi-presidential countries. As 
Cheibub (2006) has demonstrated, any such study may tell us something about 
the relative performance of parliamentarism vs. presidentialism, but it cannot tell 
us anything meaningful about semi-presidentialism as a whole. The variation 
within this category is simply too great. 
That said, we can still operationalise semi-presidentialism, but when we 
do so we need to distinguish the variation with this category. We may 
distinguish between two types of semi-presidentialism: president-
parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism (Shugart, 2005; 2006). We may 
distinguish between three types of semi-presidentialism: parliamentary-like, 
dual presidential/prime ministerial, and presidential-like semi-presidentialism 
(Elgie, 2005). We may use a continuous measure, such as Siaroff’s measure of 
presidential power, to capture the variation within semi-presidentialism. 
Whatever the preferred distinction, we can then explore the effect of institutional 
variation. For example, do semi-presidential countries with president-
parliamentary regimes perform worse than countries with premier-presidential 
regimes as Shugart seems to suggest? Do semi-presidential countries with higher 
Siaroff scores perform worse than semi-presidential countries with lower scores? 
We may decide to explore the effect of variation within semi-presidentialism 
solely within the universe of semi-presidential countries as in the above 
examples. Otherwise, we may wish to compare the effects of variation within 
semi-presidential countries to other types of countries. For example, we may 
compare the performance of presidential countries solely with semi-presidential 
that are president-parliamentary. We may decide to compare the performance of 
both presidential countries and president-parliamentary countries with premier-
presidential countries. These research strategies flow directly from the 
acknowledgement of variation within semi-presidentialism. (See Figure 5). 
 Figure 5 about here 
The notion of variation within semi-presidentialism is entirely consistent 
with Duverger’s work. His schema for the comparative study of semi-
presidentialism may be problematic, but one of his insights was the idea of 
systematic variation. For instance, despite the logic of his definition and its 
implication that a semi-presidential country was one where the president must 
have “quite considerable powers”, Duverger consistently classed countries such 
as Austria, Iceland and Ireland as semi-presidential, even though political 
practice is undoubtedly parliamentary. Writing about these countries in his 
political science textbook, he states “these three countries have semi-presidential 
constitutions but operate effectively like parliamentary systems” (Duverger, 
1996, p. 504). In other words, Duverger viewed countries such as Austria, Iceland 
and Ireland as having parliamentary-like semi-presidential systems, whereas 
France had a more presidential-like semi-presidential system. 
The idea of variation within semi-presidentialism means that there can be 
no archetypal example of semi-presidentialism. So, France should no longer be 
associated with any such epithet. At best, France could be a typical example of 
particular type of semi-presidentialism – perhaps as an example of the dual 
presidential/prime ministerial type or, in Shugart’s terminology, as an example 
of premier-presidentialism – but not a typical example of semi-presidentialism as 
a whole. The universe of semi-presidentialism is so varied that no country 
should be considered as an archetypal semi-presidential country. 
 
After Duverger: the recent study of semi-presidentialism and the French case 
 
In his work Duverger was concerned with explaining why the president’s 
constitutional powers were not an accurate predictor of actual presidential 
power. He was also concerned with explaining why presidential power varies 
over time within one country. This is why he focused on the importance of the 
president’s relationship with the parliamentary majority. Recent work on semi-
presidentialism has addressed issues that are closely related to Duverger’s 
concerns. This work has also illustrated the importance of identifying variation 
within semi-presidentialism. At the same time, the recent work has had a much 
narrower focus than Duverger’s overarching concern for presidential power 
generally. This work has also operationalised the notion of variation within semi-
presidentialism much more systematically. Some of this work has incorporated 
France into the research agenda. However, there is plenty of room for this recent 
work to be applied to France much more systematically. 
In his work, Oleh Protsyk has adopted the strategy of examining only 
countries with semi-presidential constitutions and has focused on institutional 
variation within semi-presidentialism to explain variation in political outcomes. 
In his 2005 study, he aimed to explain why cabinet formation outcomes vary 
across countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Protsyk, 2005). He argues that 
variation is the result of whether a country has a president-parliamentary form of 
semi-presidentialism or a premier-presidential form, though he notes the 
importance of other variables too, such as whether or not the party system was 
clientelistic and whether or not presidential and parliamentary elections were 
concurrent. In his 2006 study, he focused on presidential/prime ministerial 
conflict and aimed to explain why it varied from one country to another 
(Protsyk, 2006). Again, he focused only on semi-presidential countries and again 
he hypothesised that the level of conflict varies as a function whether there was a 
president-parliamentary or a premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism. 
In fact, he finds that this variable did not explain the level of conflict very well, 
but that other factors, such as the level of party system development, the 
ideological positioning of the prime minister and the level of support for the 
prime minister in the legislature, were much better predictors of intra-executive 
conflict. 
Both of these studies have great potential to be applied more widely and 
for France to be included in the study. For example, in his 2006 work Protsyk 
uses secondary sources to determine the level of presidential/prime ministerial 
conflict. There are plenty of equivalent sources that could identify periods of 
greater and lesser degrees of conflict in the French case. Indeed, Duverger’s 
empirical work would provide a good starting point for coverage of the first 30 
years of the Fifth Republic at least. The explanatory variables are also relevant, 
especially if the general level of party system development were to be 
substituted for the level of party institutionalisation as proxied perhaps by the 
date that French parties were most recently (re-)formed. 
Another recent study is by Neto and Strøm (2006). Their aim was to 
explain why the level of non-partisan ministers varies across countries. They 
hypothesised that the level of presidential powers and the prime minister’s 
electoral prospects explained the variation. They captured the variation within 
semi-presidentialism by using Shugart and Carey’s measure of the president’s 
legislative powers. They hypothesised and found that the greater the president’s 
powers, the more non-partisan ministers were included in the cabinet. The 
situation in France neatly fits their findings. 
The research strategy adopted by Neto and Strøm differed from the one 
adopted by Protsyk in two key respects. They used a continuous measure to 
capture variation within semi-presidentialism rather than Protsyk’s dichotomous 
measure. In addition, their universe was not simply semi-presidential countries, 
but also parliamentary countries with an indirectly elected head of state. This 
shows how semi-presidential can be compared with other types of comparable 
systems. In her work, Margit Tavits has also adopted this case selection strategy. 
She wishes to explain why actual presidential power, rather than the president’s 
constitutional power, varies across this set of countries and she identifies a 
number of proxies to capture the extent of presidential power (Tavits, 2008). She 
uses quantitative and qualitative analysis to show that, contrary to common-
sense expectations, direct election does not account for variation in presidential 
power across Europe. Instead, presidential power varies more as a function of 
the party political opportunity structure. 
The work by both Neto and Strøm and Margits includes France as one of 
the countries in the model. Like Duverger, their work is comparative and France 
is a suitable case for consideration. Unlike Duverger, though, this work starts 
from a theoretical basis and then tests hypotheses on the set of suitable cases. In 
Duverger’s work, there is always the sense that France comes first. The French 
case is the main focus of attention and a comparative model is then derived from 
the French case. This inductive strategy is understandable, but it may be the 
cause of some of the problems with Duverger’s research design. The recent 
deductive literature incorporating semi-presidentialism suggests that 
theoretically driven models can provide more robust cross-national explanations 
of the fundamental issues with which Duverger was concerned – presidential 
power, presidential/prime ministerial conflict etc – than studies that focus on 
France alone or on studies that extrapolate from the French case. In short, the 
study of France and the study of semi-presidentialism generally would benefit, 
first, from the incorporation of France into comparative studies and, second, 
from the development of theory-driven comparative work that includes France. 
 Conclusion 
 
France is often treated as the example of semi-presidentialism par excellence. This 
article has demonstrated that semi-presidential countries operate in many 
different ways. Therefore, the idea of an archetypal semi-presidential country, 
whether France or any other, is misplaced. That said, the concept of semi-
presidentialism captures a particular constitutional arrangement and the 
identification of this concept was one of Maurice Duverger’s great contributions 
to political science. (Hopefully, constitutional lawyers will catch on soon). 
Moreover, within the category of countries with semi-presidential constitutions, 
there are identifiables types of semi-presidentialism. There are ways in which 
variation within semi-presidentialism can be captured systematically. Again, 
Duverger recognised this diversity and found ways of expressing it, although his 
inductive approach is less successful at explaining cross-national variation than 
more recent deductive models. Although not an archetypal example of semi-
presidentialism, France is a natural case for inclusion in semi-presidential 
studies. The study of semi-presidentialism would benefit from theories being 
tested on as wide a range of countries as possible, including France. The 
inclusion of France, and as many comparable countries as possible, in semi-
presidential studies can only make the conclusions drawn about this regime type 
as generalisable as possible. This strategy will also further increase interest in 
Duverger’s concept of semi-presidentialism, a concept whose time has come, not 
just apparently but definitely. 
Figure 1 European countries with semi-presidential constitutions, 2008 
 
Country  Year Country  Year  
Austria  1945 
Belarus  1994 
Bulgaria  1991 
Croatia  1990 
Finland  1919 
France  1962 
Iceland  1944 
Ireland  1937 
Lithuania  1992 
Macedonia  1991 
Montenegro  2007 
Poland  1990 
Portugal  1976 
Romania  1990 
Russia   1993 
Serbia   2007 
Slovakia  1999 
Slovenia  1991 
Ukraine  1991 
 
Figure 2 Duverger’s 1978 ranking of the president’s constitutional powers 











Source: Duverger (1978, p. 22-23) 
Table 1 Shugart and Carey’s measures of presidential powers in 
European semi-presidential systems 
 
 PKV PTV DC EXL BUD REF CF CD CEN DIS TOT 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 4 
Bulgaria 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Croatia 
1990-1999 
0 0 1 0 0 2 1 2 2 1 9 
Croatia 
2000- 
0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 7 
Finland 
2000- 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
France 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 5 
Iceland 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 0 0 4 11 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 6 
Macedonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Poland 
1992-1996 
2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 8 
Poland 
1997- 
1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 6 
Portugal 
1976-1982 
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 4 10.5 
Portugal 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 7.5 
1983- 
Romania 0 0 1 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 7 
Slovakia 
1999-2000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Slovakia 
2001- 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Slovenia 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 
Ukraine 
1992-2005 
2 0 4 0 0 2 1 4 0 0 13 
Ukraine 
2006- 




PKV = Package veto; PTV = Pocket veto; DC = Decree powers; EXL = Exclusive 
introduction of legislation; BUD = Budgetary powers; REF = Referendum 
proposal; CF = Cabinet formation; CD = Cabinet dismissal; CEN = Cabinet 
censure; DIS = Dissolution of Assembly 
See Shugart and Carey (1992, pp. 150) for scoring schema. 
Scores for Central and Eastern Europe taken from Elgie and Moestrup (2008). 
Scores for Western Europe calculated by author for this article. 
Table 2 Siaroff’s measures of presidential powers in European semi-
presidential systems 
 
 PE CE AP CM VT EDP FP GF DL Total 
Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Bulgaria 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Croatia 
1990-2000 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Croatia 
2001- 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Finland 
1919-1956 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 
Finland 
1957-1994 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 6 
Finland 
1995-1999 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 
Finland 
2000- 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
France 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 7 
Iceland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Lithuania 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 
Macedonia 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 




1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Portugal 
1976-1982 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 6 
Portugal 
1983- 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Slovakia 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Slovenia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ukraine 
1992-1996 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 6 
Ukraine 
1997- 




PE = popularly elected; CE = concurrent presidential and legislative elections; AP 
= discretionary appointments powers; CM = chairs cabinet meetings; VT = veto 
power; EDP = long-term emergency or decree powers; FP = central role in 
foreign policy; GF = central role in government formation; DL = ability to 
dissolve the legislature 
Scores taken from Siaroff (2003, pp. 299-300). 
Figure 3 The founding context of European semi-presidentialism 
 
Country Founding context 
Austria 
New constitution following democratisation. A strong 
presidency was associated with prior collapse of democracy. 
First president elected by parliament and was a figurehead. 
Bulgaria 
New constitution following democratisation. Direct election 
was a compromise. Outgoing majority party sensed it would 
lose election and ensured a weak presidency. 
Croatia 
New Constitution following independence. Direct election of a 
strong president suited the majority party after first elections. 
Finland 
New constitution soon after independence and civil war. 
Direct election was a compromise. President adopted many of 
the Czar’s powers from the previous regime. 
France 
Direct election was a constitutional amendment. The reform 
was designed to reinforce an already presidentialised system. 
Iceland 
New Constitution following independence. The president was 
expected to be a figurehead like the monarch under former 
Danish rule. First president was elected by parliament. 
Ireland 
New constitution. Historic and strong leader remained as 
prime minister. First president was non-political and was the 
sole nominee, so no direct election. 
Lithuania 
New constitution following independence and 
democratisation. Semi-presidentialism was a compromise. 
Macedonia 
New Constitution following independence. Semi-
presidentialism chosen quickly. The new system continued the 
former-communist tradition of a weak presidency. 
Poland 
Direct election was a constitutional amendment during 
democratisation process. This suited the new non-communist 
majority, but this majority was very divided. 
Portugal 
New constitution following democratisation. The main force 
behind democratisation supported semi-presidentialism. 
Romania 
Direct election was a constitutional amendment quickly after 
the collapse of communist regime. Leader of new majority 
won first election easily. 
Slovakia 
Direct election was a constitutional amendment. It was 
designed to allow the president to be chosen following 
previous difficulties in electing the president by parliament.  
Slovenia 
New constitution following independence and 
democratisation. Semi-presidentialism was a compromise: 
direct election was popular, but parliament reduced 
presidential powers because majority forces sensed the 
incumbent president would be re-elected. 
Ukraine Direct election was a constitutional amendment quickly after 
the collapse of communist regime. 
 
Source: country chapters in Elgie ed. (1999) and Elgie and Moestrup eds. (2008). 
For Portugal, Martins (2006). 
Table 3 Frequency of cohabitation and minority government in European 
semi-presidential countries (% of years as SP) 
 
 Cohabitation – 
president and PM 
from different 












Austria 11.3 56.5 6.5 
Bulgaria 40.0 0.0 0.0 
Croatia 0.0 0.0 37.5 
Finland 19.5 43.7 26.4 
France 20.5 4.5 7.0 
Iceland 22.6 19.4 6.3 
Ireland 24.3 7.1 32.9 
Lithuania 13.3 0.0 26.7 
Macedonia 6.7 0.0 0.0 
Poland 35.3 5.9 29.4 
Portugal 54.8 9.7 32.3 
Romania 0.0 12.5 62.5 
Slovakia 37.5 62.5 0.0 
Slovenia 13.3 0.0 6.7 
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 75.0 
WE average 22.8 26.7 18.3 
CEE average 16.0 6.4 28.0 
Average 21.0 21.4 22.2 
 
Source: For cohabitation and coalition, dataset primarily constructed from 
www.worldstatesmen.org/. For minority government, World Bank’s Database of 




Data for minority government prior to 1975: Austria and France from the country 
chapters in Elgie (1999 ed.); Finland from Strom (1990); Ireland from Mitchell 
(2001). 
All calculations are from the beginning of semi-presidentialism to the end of 
2006, except Iceland minority government from 1975-2004. 
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Source: Duhamel (1995, p. 125). Updated by the author. 
Figure 5 Operationalising the study of semi-presidentialism 
 









Types of semi-presidentialism e.g., 
based on the president’s constitutional 
powers 




e.g. Siaroff presidential power scores 
Dependent 
variable 
1.) Success of failure of democratization 




Case selection 1.) Comparison of SP countries only, 
2.) Comparison of presidential and 
president-parliamentary SP countries 




                                                 
1 Subsequent editions of his political science textbook updated existing work, 
rather than offering a new analysis. 
2 Depending on where the boundaries of Europe are drawn, then there could 
now be 20 European semi-presidential countries following the October 2007 
referendum in Turkey that approved the direct election of the president. The first 
direct election is due take place no later than 2014 or 2012 if the reduction in the 
president’s mandate from seven to five years is applied to the incumbent 
president rather than the first directly elected president.  
3 It might also be noted that Moldova was semi-presidential until 2000 when a 
parliamentary system was established. 
4 For the West European countries, there was a high degree of reliability between 
Shugart and Carey’s (1992, p. 155) scores and the author’s calculations for this 
article. In the French case, we disregarded Article 40 because it does not refer 
specifically to a bill introduced by the president. Given Shugart and Carey also 
seem to disregard this article in their scoring, we assume that they do intend to 
impose this restriction. 
5 The reliability of some of Siaroff’s scores must be questioned. For example, in 
Ireland the president does not have the right to veto legislation, yet Siaroff’s 
measures indicate that this is the case. In Ireland, the president has the right to 
send a bill to the Supreme Court for its constitutionality to be judged. This is the 
equivalent of Article 61 of the 1958 French Constitution rather than Article 10, 
which outlines the French president’s limited veto power. So, Siaroff’s score for 
Ireland should be 2, not 3, bringing it rightfully back into his category of 
countries where political practice is parliamentary. 
6 Siaroff scores 1 for direct election. So, all semi-presidential countries will score 
at least 1. 
7 The recent Turkish shift to semi-presidentialism is similar to the French case in 
both aspects. 
8 Translations by the author. 
                                                 
9 In addition, the constraint imposed by Article 12 means that the previous 
dissolution must not have taken place in the preceding 12 months in order for 
this strategy to be possible. 
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